ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The pilots responsible for flying the nation's airlines are scrutinized very closely for their health and piloting skills. The traveling public demands this scrutiny and it is the responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to set minimum standards for safety. Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 61.151 requires airline transport pilots to obtain a first class medical certificate (Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association [AOPA), 1992 (Hunsicker, 1990) .
The Federal Register gives one definition of "reasonable accommodation" as, "Modification or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant desires." (Federal Register, 1991) This definition is applicable to the airlines' visual acuity requirements. The term "undue hardship" means, with respect to provision of an accommodation, significant difficulty or expense incurred by a covered entity in light of the following factors:
(1) The nature and net cost of the accommodation, (2) The overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommo<!.ation, (3) The overall financial resources of the covered entity, (4) The type of operation or operations of the covered entity, and'
(5) The impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the facility Are VISUlll Acuit1 Requirements Justifiable? (Federal Register, 1991) .
A letter was sent to Bobby Silverstein, Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Senate Subcommittee on Disability Policy, explaining the FAA's and the airline industry's visual acuity requirements and asking if the ADA would be applicable to this subject. The following statement is from a letter dated 4 February 1992, from Silverstein: (personal communication, February 4, 1992) The threshold question in determining coverage under Title I of the ADA is whether a person has a disability as defined by the Act. The definition of disability under the ADA addresses three different circumstances.
The first two circumstances covered in the definition require that the individual have an impairment that 'substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.' An individual with a minor vision impairment may not meet this requirement if the impairment is not of sufficient severity to substantially limit any major life activities.
The third part of the definition of disability, which is 'being regarded as having such an impairment,' is most pertinent to the situation you describe. This includes individuals with impairments that are not sub-8 stantially limiting in major life activities in cases where a covered entity treats the impairment as constituting such a limitation.
An example of this would be where an employer reassigns an employee with controlled high blood pressure, which does not substantially limit that individual's activities, to a less strenuous job due to unsubstantiated fears that the individual will suffer a heart attack.
The facts that you present appear to fit within this category. In the case you describe, the airlines have criteria for pilots that screens out individuals with corrected vision. Assuming that the individuaI'svisionimpairment does not substantially limit any major life activities, the employer must be able to show that the selection criteria is job related and consistent with a business necessity. The airlines would have to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for screening out persons with corrected vision.
The fact that the Federal Aviation Adminis tra tion allows persons with corrected vision to obtain pilot'S licenses would lend support to the argument that the more stringent criteria set by some airlines is not jobrelated or consistent with a business necessity. Since the airlines did not provide any detailed reasons for their visual acuity restrictions, this paper assumes that the airline industry could justify vision requirements on the basis of: safety, performance, and investment risk. The terms 'safety' and 'performance' need no further explanation; the term 'investment' risk, as used in this paper, refers to the airline industry spending resources on a newly hired pilot. According to a telephone conversation with Walter Coleman, Vice President of Operations, for the Air Transport Association, the airline industry spends approximately $40,500 to train a newly hired pilot.
An additional $4,000 per pilot is spent on training every year, and another SlO,OOO is required to upgrade a pilot to captain. Coleman continued, saying that all of these estimates are conservative. Assuming a newly hired pilot is a captain in five years, the airlines will have invested over S70,OOO in direct training costs alone. Given this investment, it is understandable why the airlines would want to keep their pilots vision well within the FAA's 20/200 limit. If there is medical evidence to support the contention that a pilot with 20/20 uncorrected vision has significantly stronger and healthier eyes over time than a pilot with less than 20/20 uncorrected vision, then the airlines would be able to reduce the risk of a pilot losing the first class medical certificate and airline transport pilot rating. Losing a pilot after a $70,000 investment would be very costly to a company and could be argued as undue hardship as defined by the ADA The purpose of this paper is to investigate safety, performance, and investment risk and determine whether the airline industry is justified in requiring a more stringent vision criterion than that of the FAA The Israel Air Force Aeromedical center conducted a study of helicopter pilots in 1987. The visual acuity of 38 helicopter pilots experiencing serious air accidents was compared to a control group of 72 pilots. The subjects were matched for age, aircraft, and flight hours. Subjects with decreased visual acuity were divided into two groups. The first group had minor decreases in vision up to 20/25 and did not require corrective lenses. The second group had visual acuity of 20/30 or worse with correction to 20/20 using lenses. The study concluded that helicopter pilots with corrective lenses or minor uncorrected decreases in visual acuity are not at increased risk for serious air accidents (Froom, 1987) .
The following studies refer to performance. The U.S. Army conducted a study in 1968 of the performance of pilots with uncorrected 20/20 vision and pilots with vision corrected to 20aO. The study conducted a comparative evaluation of the performance of 113 students with refractive error. The performance of students requiring c..orrective lenses was Another performance study was conducted by the Department of Ophthalmology, Naval Aerospace Medical Institute. In 1987, the performance of 4S student naval aviators with correctj,.'C lenses who underwent primaf)' night training at NAS \\lliting Field, Florida, were studied. The outcome variablo Vr'Cre completion rate, prima~nl~ht training grades, and nl~ht hours. The control group u.'Cd for the completion rate v.4L\ all other students who undeNcnl primary flight training dunng the same time period. Th~controls for training grades and flight hours were randomly selected from individuals who attended the same training squadrons as the corrective lens wearers under study. Additionally, the controls for training grades and flight hours must have completed flight training within one month of the corrective lens wearers under study. The 10 results demonstrated that aviators with corrective lenses were significantly more likely to complete training. These results were associated with the increased screening and motivation of the corrective lens wearers. However, the corrective lens wearers were not significantly different in primary flight grades or hours. The results suggest that naval aviators with corrective lenses were competitive with their contemporaries (Bohnker, 1991) .
The This paper used the closest geographically located optometrists. The first three agreeing to an interview were selected; a total of five were contacted. The ophthalmologist who agreed to an interview was provided with an academic associate. This associate's only knowledge of this paper's subject matter was its need for vision experts. Although the sample size of experts is admittedly small, the consistency of the responses from the four experts lends support to the argument that a larger sample size would produce similar results.
The vision experts were given background information on the FAA's and the major airlines' vision requirements. They were also informed that the average age of a newly hired pilot for the major airlines is 34 (Massey, 1990) . Since the airlines list only one vision requirement for a pilot applicant, visual acuity, the experts were instructed to consider the pilots in question in exactly the same manner except for visual acuity. Once it was clear that the experts understood this background information, the subjects were given a series of questions about pilots in the visual acuity range of He went on to say that standard eye charts jump from the measurement of 20/100 to 20(200; therefore, an eye chart which could measure visual acuity between 20/100 and 20/200 would be required, a task that could easily be accomplished. Baker stated, "EqUipment is available that can measure visual acuity very accurately by using responses from the brain" (Bradley Baker, personal interview, January 27, 1992).
Are VISUal Acuity Requirements Justifiable?
SUMMARY
The purpose of this paper was to review safety, performance, and investment risk and determine whether the airline industry is justified in requiring a more stringent vision criterion than the FAA requires. While this is an important issue because of our country's spirit of fair play, the new law established by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 establishes legal protection, which may have a tremendous impact on the U.S. airlines' hiring procedures and/or litigation.
According to Silverstein, Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Senate Subcommittee on Disability Policy, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 requires the airlines to provide non-discriminatory reasons for the more stringent vision criteria. These reasons must be jobrelated or consistent with a business necessity. The major airlines were contacted several times requesting detailed reasons for the more stringent vision criteria, but none provided the requested information. Therefore, this paper assumed that all job-related and business necessity reasons would fall into three areas: safety, performance, and investment risk.
This paper accessed many computer databases: NTIS, STAR, MEDLINE, LION, and others. Additional organizations contacted for information and assistance, included FAA, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, u.S. Air
